

ENLARGED IN DIVERSITY

THE EU ENLARGEMENT PROCESS
AND ITS PERSPECTIVES



Author: Adam Balcer

Warsaw, May 2019

ENLARGED IN DIVERSITY

**THE EU ENLARGEMENT PROCESS
AND ITS PERSPECTIVES**

Warsaw, May 2019

© Copyright by Polska Fundacja im. Roberta Schumana

Author:

Adam Balcer,
Foreign Policy Project Manager at WiseEuropa, National Researcher at the ECFR, lecturer at the Centre for East European Studies (SEW) at the University of Warsaw, author of the historical podcast 'Lechistan' at the radio station TOK FM.

The author made all reasonable efforts to ensure that the report is impartial and objective. The publisher had no involvement in the formulation of the theses and their presentation in the report.

All rights reserved.

Published by:



Polska Fundacja im. Roberta Schumana / the Polish Robert Schuman Foundation

Aleje Ujazdowskie 37/5, 00-540 Warsaw

+48 22 621 21 61, +48 22 621 75 55

poczta@schuman.pl

www.schuman.pl

ISBN: 978-83-88752-24-7

Graphic design and printing:

Pracownia C&C Sp. z o.o.



Co-funded by the
Europe for Citizens Programme
of the European Union

The publication was prepared as part of the project 'EnlargEUrope' co-funded by the Europe for Citizens Programme of the European Union. The European Commission support for the production of this publication does not constitute an endorsement of the contents which reflect the views only of the author, and the Commission cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained therein.

LIST OF CONTENTS

Theses **4**

Introduction **6**

The EU enlargement on balance **6**

 Membership criteria **7**

 The attitude of EU citizens to the enlargement **9**

Turkey – a unique and virtual candidate country **10**

Other European countries **11**

Western Balkans **12**

 Demography, economy and ethnic and religious structure **13**

The EU enlargement to Western Balkans **16**

Prognosis **18**

THESES

1. The enlargement of the European Union (EU; until 1993, the European Economic Community, EEC) resulted in the number of its member states growing nearly fivefold over the period of 60 years and, more importantly, in the democratisation and modernisation of several European countries (in the Mediterranean Basin and Central and Eastern Europe). No other process in the world has released a comparable transformative potential in the past few decades, combining internal affairs with foreign policy to an unprecedented extent. The enlargement had a significant geographical, demographic, economic and cultural dimension, changing the distribution of power within the EU and the Union itself. The most important enlargement took place in 2004-2007, when the EU was joined by 12 countries with the total population of over 100 million people.
2. Formally, Turkey is nowadays the leading candidate in the accession negotiations. However, the process has been suspended due to Turkey's backsliding toward authoritarian rule. Effectively, this makes its current accession to the EU nearly impossible. In addition, Turkey's candidacy has raised an unprecedented opposition in the EU. This is mostly due to its demographic potential – its population has already reached 80 million people and is still growing – as well as the country's internal problems related to the situation of Kurds and Alevis, combined with Turkey's political polarisation and conflicts with the neighbouring countries, some of which are EU members. Equally relevant is Turkey's specific culture represented by its more conservative Muslim society. Having applied for the EU membership over 30 years ago, Turkey had its status approved only 20 years later. Its accession negotiations have now continued for nearly 15 years.
3. The EU enlargement process focuses nowadays mostly on the Western Balkans. The integration of this region is a far more challenging task for the EU compared to the accession of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in 2004-2007. Freedom House, a USA-based independent watchdog organisation that analyses political systems in the world, defines the status of all Western Balkan countries as Partly Free for the period of over 45 years (democracy remains a key criterion for joining the EU).¹ The main causes behind problems with the EU enlargement to the Western Balkans include:

 - Legacy of the 1990s and early-21st century wars (conflicts between ethnic groups, unresolved problems related to unsettled war crimes, Bosnia's deeply rooted internal divides, international status of Kosovo);
 - Negative influence of the legacy of the communist era and, to a certain extent, the Ottoman Empire and Byzantium (authoritarian elements next to pluralistic ones);
 - A fairly strong position in the region of non-EU actors (Russia, China, Turkey), similar in their authoritarian attitude and lack of support for democratisation processes, which poses a challenge for the EU and its activity in the Western Balkans (particularly with respect to Russia);
 - Internal affairs of the EU which jeopardise its influences and credibility in the region: anti-democratic movements, weakening of the rule of law also in the youngest EU member states (which undermines the very process of integration), independent activity of smaller and medium-size EU actors in the Western Balkans, no leading or clearly defined advocate of the region in the EU, daily challenges that the EU needs to face on a current basis, negative attitude of the relative majority of EU citizens to further enlargement, particularly in major EU member states, disputes between individual EU member states and Western Balkan countries;

¹ Freedom House ranks countries as Free, Partly Free and Not Free (see Footnote No 18 below).

- Next to most of the Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries, the Western Balkans are the poorest region in Europe that continues to struggle with high unemployment rates, large grey market and low labour market participation;
 - The Western Balkans stand out for their high corruption levels. The situation is only worse in the EaP countries, with the exception of Georgia. Organised crime is still prevalent although it is weaker than several years ago.
4. The Western Balkans are already very strongly integrated with the EU. However, this contributes to the EU perceiving this region in the categories of 'small stabilisation' and keeping its countries in the 'waiting room'. Such a long pre-accession and negotiation process is to ensure their effective preparation for joining the EU. This inconsistency in support for the EU enlargement – with some EU member states inhibiting the Council's decisions regarding the accession process of the Western Balkan countries despite the Commission's recommendations and agreement from most of the EU members – further exacerbated by the region's severe internal problems adding to the arguments against its accession may give the effect of a vicious circle, discouraging the local communities and elites.
 5. From the vantage point of the EU's global ambitions, the future of the six Western Balkan countries inhabited by just over 18 million people does not seem to be very significant and neither does it pose a great challenge. Nevertheless, the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) was born in the Western Balkans which remain a very important arena for its implementation (missions), also in cooperation with NATO, USA and Turkey. It is also a clash area of the influences between the EU and Russia, China, Turkey (at times) and the countries of the Persian Gulf. The enlargement to the Western Balkans would have a great civilisa-
- tional meaning for the EU, with the vast majority of the region inhabited by Muslims. After the countries of the Eastern Partnership, the Western Balkans are potentially the second most unstable region in Europe. Yet, in terms of safety the situation in the Western Balkans is far better than in the Southern Neighbourhood of the EU. The deteriorating quality of democracy recently observed in some Western Balkan countries, despite their progress in the integration with the EU, is a matter for concern. In the light of these phenomena, the integration of the Western Balkans with the EU is of much greater importance for the democratisation, rule of law, unification and, particularly, safety of the EU candidates than the EU's largest single expansion in 2004.
6. Formally, the countries of the Eastern Partnership may, as European countries, apply for the EU membership. Some of them (Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova) achieve similar – and sometimes even better – results compared to the Western Balkan countries with respect to such key EU enlargement criteria as democracy quality and corruption levels. Nevertheless, unlike the Western Balkans, the EaP countries are not perceived as potential EU candidates. It is rather unlikely for the EU to change its mind in this matter. This restrained approach is driven by Russia's explicit opposition to the Euro-Atlantic integration of the EaP countries. Through its policy toward Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, Moscow has already shown that it is prepared to use military force to block their pro-European ambitions (frozen conflicts, proto-states). In the case of Ukraine, the greatest challenge to its accession, as perceived by many European elites and communities, is its demography (over 40 million citizens) combined with low levels of economic development (after Moldova, Ukraine is the poorest country in Europe in terms of purchasing power parity) and high levels of corruption.

INTRODUCTION

The EU enlargement is the process of new countries joining the EU. Since the foundation of the EEC in 1958, the number of EU member states has risen from six to 28 in seven consecutive enlargements. Their global consequences have been significant, with the EU becoming the second largest economic organism in the world, inhabited by over 500 million people (the third largest population). The EEC/EU enlargement has led to radical geopolitical transformations, changing the division of Europe established after the Second World War and the Yalta Conference. The EEC/EU enlargement has profoundly changed this organisation and candidate countries. European integration has contributed to the strengthening of democracy in the vast majority of new members, substantially improving their economic situation. The foundation of the EEC/EU, followed by its subsequent enlargements, has also had profound cultural and historical effects, en-

couraging a reflection on the identity of Europe. The basic point of reference for the founding members of the EEC was the monarchy of Charlemagne. The first enlargement in 1973, by some referred to as 'Euro-Atlantic' or 'reconciliation' enlargement, was based on the Nordic and Anglo-Saxon heritage with Celtic elements. In the 1980s, the next stage of the expansion process came with the Mediterranean, or more specifically Iberian enlargement (Greece, Spain, Portugal). The subsequent enlargements in 1995, 2004-2007 and 2013 marked a radical shift of the EU borders to the East and the final collapse of the Iron Curtain, bringing in a clear Baltic (including Nordic), Central and Eastern European (including Habsburg) and Balkan (including Byzantine and Ottoman) dimensions, with the latter being continued under the current enlargement process.

THE EU ENLARGEMENT ON BALANCE

Upon its foundation in 1958 by six countries: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, the EEC predicted the possibility to accept new members. Denmark, Ireland, Norway and the United Kingdom applied for membership as early as in 1961.² Initially, they were blocked by France which was afraid that this would strengthen the position of the USA in Europe. They had to re-apply in 1967, this time to no opposition from Paris. Eventually, three of them were admitted in 1973, with the exclusion of Norway where membership was rejected in a referendum. The next stage of the EU enlargement took place in the 1980s, when Greece, Spain and Portugal joined the EEC, having just emerged from dictatorships. Their democratisation was closely related to their integration with the EEC. They applied for membership shortly after they

entered the path of democracy: Greece in 1975, Portugal and Spain in 1977. The former joined the EEC as early as in 1981, while Spain and Portugal only in 1986. Greece's fast admission resulted from its strategic position in the Balkans, on the border with the Soviet Bloc and Turkey (severe Greek-Turkish tensions), France lobbying for Greece and the EEC countries fearing the possibility of the then more Eurosceptic socialists taking over the power in Athens. On the other hand, the accession of Spain and Portugal raised significant economic reservations in France and Italy.

The end of the Cold War resulted in Austria, Finland and Sweden, i.e. neutral countries and in the aftermath of the Yalta conference neighbours of the Eastern Bloc, changing their attitude toward the EU. In 1989-1992,

² At the beginning of the 1950s, the United Kingdom rejected the invitation from the 'inner six', i.e. the six states that founded the EEC, to participate in talks on establishing the Community.

MEMBERSHIP CRITERIA

The EEC did not have clear normative or geographical criteria defined in its Treaties for accepting new members. From early on it was not consistent in applying the geographical criterion (European states), as best shown for example by non-European territories administered as integral parts of France (1958-1962) and Denmark (1973-1985) as well as Turkey (as a candidate) and Cyprus.³ Paradoxically, in the years 1958-1962 and 1973-1985, the majority of the Community's territory was outside Europe. Also, since its foundation the EEC/EU has undergone changes to its territory irrespective of the enlargements (e.g. the reunification of Germany), some of which involved territories lying outside Europe (e.g. Algeria, Greenland).⁴ It was not until the Treaty of Maastricht from 1992, under which the EEC was one year later transformed into the EU, and the Copenhagen or the accession criteria from 1993 that clearer membership requirements were introduced. Article 49 of the Maastricht Treaty stated: 'Any European State which respects the values referred to in Article 2 and is committed to promoting them may apply to become a member of the Union.' Facing the possibility of a large group of post-communist Central and Eastern European countries joining in, the EU adopted the Copenhagen criteria in 1993. According to them, candidate countries must meet the following essential conditions:

- Stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities;
- A functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competition and market forces within the EU;
- Capacity to effectively implement the *acquis* and ability to take on the political, economic and currency obligations of membership.

The Copenhagen criteria assume that the EU itself also needs to be able to accept new members. With these accession criteria, enlargement was made strictly dependent on economic and political transformation. This process of combining integration with transformation started in the second half of the 1970s with the Mediterranean countries emerging from authoritarian regimes and moving on to build democratic institutions in order to join the Community.

they applied for the status of candidate countries and joined the EU in 1995. Soon other neutral countries followed suit: Malta and Cyprus in 1990, and Switzerland in 1992. Malta withdrew its application only to re-apply in 1995 and eventually join the EU along with

Cyprus as part of the 'big bang' enlargement in 2004 (see below).⁵ In the meantime, Norway made another attempt to enter the EU. In 1992, Switzerland also applied but Swiss citizens voted against membership in the European Economic Area (EEA) in a referendum in

³ In 1958-1962, over 80% of the territory of France was in Africa (with Algeria recognised as a French department). In 1973-1985, when Greenland was part of the EEC, less than 2% of Denmark's territory was in Europe. The entire territory of Cyprus formally lies in Asia. In the case of Turkey, 97% of its territory is in Asia, with the vast majority of the country's citizens living there.

⁴ In 1985, Greenland left the EEC. In 1990, the reunification of East and West Germany brought East Germany into the Community.

⁵ Due to the division of Cyprus its accession was a much longer process. Since the invasion in 1974, the northern part of the island has been under Turkish military occupation.

the very same year. Consequently, Switzerland froze its application which however remained a long-term goal on the agenda of the subsequent Swiss governments. In 2016, Bern formally withdrew its application. EU membership was also rejected for the second time by Norwegians in the 1994 referendum.

In the 1990s, after the collapse of communism and the USSR, enlargement became a key element in the EU's foreign policy toward Central Europe. The countries which until 1991 belonged to the former Soviet Bloc and the USSR or the former Yugoslavia (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia) applied for membership between 1994 and 1996, eventually joining the EU in 2004 and 2007 (Bulgaria and Romania). This was the largest single enlargement in the EU's history, with the number of its member states rising from 15 to 27. Bulgaria and Romania were admitted at a later time due to serious internal problems with corruption and the rule of law. The last country to enter the EU so far is Croatia. It applied for membership in 2003 and began accession negotiations two years later. This delay (compared to other Central European countries) was caused by the war with Serbian separatists (1991-1995) and the country's soft authoritarian rule until 2000 (Partly Free according to Freedom House). Turkey started accession negotiations together with Croatia and has been a candidate country since 1999 (see below). After Croatia, the enlargement has gradually spread to the remaining countries of the Western Balkans of which: two are now in the process of accession negotiations (Serbia, Montenegro), two are candidate countries (Albania, Macedonia), one has applied for

membership (Bosnia and Herzegovina)⁶ and one is recognised as a potential candidate (see below). Furthermore, Iceland applied for membership in 2009, having been particularly hit by the global economic crisis. In 2010, Reykjavík began accession negotiations with the EU. However, due to the growing opposition of its citizens and an improvement in the country's economic situation, the negotiations were frozen in 2013.⁷

Since the mid-1970s, the enlargement process has played a key role in the democratisation and economic modernisation of EU candidate countries. However, the past several years have shown that its reforms prove to be either reversible or difficult to implement. This may be observed on the example of the failed attempts at building a state of law in Bulgaria⁸, the stagnation of this process in Croatia and its regression in Romania despite the country's initial success in fighting corruption. Authoritarian inclinations in Poland and Hungary are also a negative trend. In 2019, Hungary's status according to Freedom House declined to Partly Free. This is an unprecedented situation in the EU's history when one of its member states no longer meets the Copenhagen criteria. Taking into account its nowadays clearly lower ratings in terms of the quality of democracy, Poland may also fall into this category within the next few years. Freedom House also points to negative tendencies, albeit on a smaller scale, in Latvia (oligarchisation). On the other hand, the democracies of some of the 'old' EU member states are also experiencing significant problems. For example, Greece is considered by Transparency International to be as corrupt as Montenegro, while Freedom House assesses the status of Greek media as Partly Free.⁹

6 Hereinafter referred to as Bosnia or BiH.

7 Until 2013, 27 *acquis* (negotiating) chapters were opened and 11 were closed.

8 According to Transparency International, Bulgaria has the highest corruption levels in the EU, higher than Montenegro.

9 According to Freedom House, the media in the EU are Partly Free in Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Poland and Romania, with Italian media ranking higher than the others. In 2018, a populist government was established in Italy. After that a significant rise has been observed in support levels for one of its coalition partners, the nationalist League party, for which Hungary is a role model.

THE ATTITUDE OF EU CITIZENS TO THE ENLARGEMENT

There has never been mass support among EU societies for the enlargement process. It has always enjoyed a greater popularity with the EEC/EU political elites rather than regular citizens. In the past few years, the number of people against further enlargement has exceeded the number of those who support it. In autumn 2013, soon after Croatia was admitted in the EU, over 50% of EU citizens opposed further enlargement compared to over 35% of those in favour. Since then, the attitude of EU citizens to enlargement has improved. In autumn 2018, the Eurobarometer surveys showed that nearly 45% of EU citizens supported further enlargement while 45% were against it. There are fundamental differences in how the respective EU societies approach further enlargement. In 2018, the support was the highest in the countries admitted to the EU in 2004-2013, particularly in Romania, Poland, Lithuania (65% for, nearly 25% against), Croatia and Hungary (over 60% for, over 30% against), Latvia, Cyprus, Slovenia (approx. 55% for, 35% against) and Bulgaria (over 50% for, nearly 30% against). A relative majority supported further enlargement in Estonia and Slovakia (over 45% for, approx. 35-40% against). Compared to these countries, the Czech Republic stood out for its negative attitude in this respect (less than 35% for, approx. 55% against). Next to new member states (enlargements of 2004-2007-2013), positive attitude was reported for the Spanish (over 70% for, 20% against), Irish (over 55% for, over 30% against) and Portuguese (50% for, nearly 40% against). Greeks were equally divided into opponents and advocates of the enlargement (with over 45% in each group, respectively). In the remaining countries of Western Europe, citizens' attitude to enlargement was often (and in some cases clearly) negative. Swedes were relatively the least critical about it, with the number of opponents only slightly exceeding that of supporters, and were followed by Italians (nearly 40% for, over 45% against) and Belgians (over 40% for, nearly 55% against). From the perspective of the future enlargement, its rejection by the French and Germans, that is societies of the most significant EU member states, is of particular importance (approx. 30% for, over 60% against). The position of Finns and Austrians on this matter was similarly negative, with other Western European societies being slightly less critical about it. The distribution of EU citizens' opinions regarding the enlargement has remained unchanged for many years. The negative attitude represented by societies of richer member states may be related to negative trends observed in the countries that joined the EU in the enlargements of 2004-2007-2013. However, this poor reputation of the enlargement process is also driven by a generally insufficient knowledge of Western European societies about its otherwise very positive effects.

TURKEY – A UNIQUE AND VIRTUAL CANDIDATE COUNTRY

Turkey is a unique candidate country. For many decades no other country that has applied for membership (without being rejected a priori), has ever raised as severe reservations among EU member states as Turkey. It applied for membership in the EEC in 1987. In the same year, Morocco followed suit. Two years later, the EEC issued a negative evaluation of both applications, but in the case of Morocco it used a clear geographical argument (a non-European country). Nevertheless, the possibility of Turkey's accession was not ruled out. Indeed, as soon as in 1963, an association agreement was signed between Turkey and the EEC, with the latter recognising its partner as a country that may become a member if it can meet the membership criteria. However, from the outset Turkey's possible membership raised very serious reservations among many EEC/EU societies and a large part of political elites, primarily the right-wing, both far-right and centre-right. Particularly negative was the attitude of France and, albeit less strict, Germany. Serious objections to Turkey's candidacy arise from many different reasons related to demography, geography, internal and external problems (including those with EU member states) and – to a great extent – culture. Turkey is a country with a large and constantly growing population: over 80 million in 2018, with the predicted 95 million in 2050. This prediction alone means that, if accepted, Turkey would be the most populous country in the EU, accounting for a significant part of the EU's population (approx. 15%). In terms of purchasing power parity, Turkish economy is already comparable to that of Italy and is much larger than that of Poland or Spain. As a result, Turkey's possible membership would radically shift the balance

of power in the EU. Still, despite its rapid growth in the first two decades of the 21st century, Turkey remains a relatively poor country compared to the EU average.¹⁰ Turkish society is also more conservative than the EU community. More importantly, the vast majority of Turks are Muslim and the country itself is struggling with severe internal ethnic (Kurds)¹¹ and religion-related issues (Alevites).¹² Turkey also has significant problems with its neighbours, including EU member states (Greece, Cyprus). Yet another issue includes Turkey's authoritarian inclinations and years of problems with the embedding of democracy in this country.¹³ Nevertheless, the EU granted Turkey the status of candidate country in 1999, mostly thanks to Germany which at that time was ruled by a coalition of the Social Democrats and Greens. The start of accession negotiations was made conditional on Turkey implementing radical democratic reforms. The decision to grant Turkey the status of candidate country was a result of strategic calculations assuming that Turkey's integration process could help overcome its internal problems, similarly to Spain in the 1970s and 1980s. In turn, the EU was to gain a powerful new member state¹⁴ that would have a positive influence on the potentially unstable Southern and Eastern Neighbourhood of the EU, thus strengthening its position in the global arena.

In 2000-2005, as part of its compliance with the EU's conditions, Turkey carried out substantial democratic reforms (the so-called 'Silent Revolution'), which made Freedom House recognise Turkey, at that time still Partly Free, as a country on the verge of being Free. As a result, in 2005 the EU moved on to start accession ne-

10 Currently, Turkey's GDP per capita measured by purchasing power parity is only slightly higher than in the poorest EU member states (Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia).

11 The civil war in Turkey has been going on for decades with different intensity. It is an armed conflict between Turkish army and police and various Kurdish insurgent groups that has already resulted in tens of thousands of casualties in Turkey and neighbouring countries.

12 Alevites are a religious minority that follows a version of Islam similar to Shiism. They account for approx. 15% of the population in Turkey.

13 In the period between the 1980 Turkish coup d'état and 2017, Turkey's status according to Freedom House was Partly Free; however, it was mostly closer to Not Free rather than Free.

14 Turkey has a significant military potential. It ranks ninth in Global Fire Power, a list of global military powers..

negotiations with Ankara. However, at the same time the EU Council decided to block eight chapters, issuing a condition that none but one chapter could be closed until Turkey expanded its customs union to include Cyprus, a new EU member state, as it was obliged to do. For the first time in history, a provision was entered into the official EU documents stating the open nature of accession negotiations whose final result cannot be predicted. The EU decided to do so despite the fact that in the 2004 referendum the vast majority of Turkish Cypriots backed the Annan Plan for Cyprus which was supported by the EU Council but rejected by Greek Cypriots. Moreover, the EU Council did not deliver on its pre-referendum promise to lift the embargo on the Turkish part of Cyprus and provide financial support to it. Subsequently, the opening of 10 chapters, partly overlapping with those blocked by the entire EU, raised the opposition from Cyprus and France, with Paris later partly drawing back. Consequently, the talks slowed down dramatically. Since 2005, Turkey has managed to open only 16 chapters and close only one. No chapter

was opened in 2010-2013, followed by another hiatus of two years (2013-2015).

As a candidate country which, compared to others, needs the most of the EU's support in the embedding of democracy, Turkey has not received a comparable level of assistance. With its anchor to Europe proving to be very weak, Turkey embarked on its initially slow authoritarian drift which clearly accelerated in 2013. The observation of human rights declined dramatically in July 2016 after the failed coup d'état attempt which the ruling party used as a pretext for introducing an authoritarian regime. Consequently, in 2017 – for the first time since the 1970s when it started publishing its annual report 'Freedom in the World' – Freedom House ranked Turkey as Non-Free. The last negotiation chapter opened by Turkey was three years ago, just before the failed coup. Currently, no work is being done with the aim to open the next chapter. In the light of this, Turkey's accession process may in fact be considered to be suspended.

OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

Although the EU is often perceived as the equivalent of Europe, many countries located at least partly in Europe or regions treated by Brussels as European (South Caucasus) are not EU members. Most of Europe's territory and a large part of its population are outside the EU. Demographically and economically, the non-EU nature of Europe will become more visible with the UK leaving the Union. The attitude to EU membership among European countries lying outside the EU, just like the attitude of the member states toward the aspirations of non-EU countries, is very diverse. As already mentioned, Norway, Switzerland and Iceland are currently not interested in joining the EU. Formally, the Eastern Partnership countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine), which form the Eastern Neighbourhood, may apply for membership. In the EU terminology, they are defined as European neighbours of the EU, while the countries of the Southern Neighbourhood are called Europe's neigh-

bours. Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine have for years declared, albeit with different intensity, their desire to join the EU. Recently Armenia has expressed similar interests but in a veiled manner so as to avoid tension in its relations with Russia.

The idea of EU membership is supported by the majority of citizens in Georgia and Ukraine and a relative majority in Moldova. In 2016-2017, the three countries signed their association agreements with the EU. Interestingly, Freedom House describes the status of Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine as more free than some countries in the Western Balkans (Bosnia, Kosovo) and similarly or slightly less free than others. Georgia stands out for its significantly lower corruption levels compared to Western Balkan countries. In the coming years, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine may apply for EU membership. However, the reaction of the most important EU member states, namely

France and Germany, may be expected to be rather sceptical as they will be concerned about the response from Russia according to which the Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries should remain under its sole influence. The Kremlin supports separatist proto-states in each of these three countries, with Russian armed forces stationed illegally in their territories. The Ukrainian Crimea was illegally annexed by Russia. Furthermore, the perspective of Ukraine joining the EU raises concerns in Berlin, Paris and many other member states, as its population is over twice as large as that of all EaP countries combined while Ukraine itself is significantly poorer than the poorest Western Balkan countries. This sceptical attitude is visible in official documents related to the Eastern Partnership which are limited to a general recognition that the countries involved in this initiative have their European aspirations and choices. The European Parliament declared its unequivocal support for EU membership of the EaP countries in its

resolutions (e.g. with respect to Ukraine in 2005, and Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine in 2014). While legally not binding, they received a large majority (approx. 2/3) of votes.

The vast majority of Russian residents live in the European part of the country which accounts for only 20% of its territory. Some EU politicians (e.g. Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, Czech President Miloš Zeman) declared their support for Russia's membership in the EU. Moreover, in a survey conducted at the beginning of the 21st century most Russians were also in favour. However, Russia's growing neo-imperialism and authoritarianism as well as its geopolitical confrontation with the West under the rule of President Vladimir Putin have translated into now only a minority of Russians still supporting this idea. More importantly, the vast majority of the EU political elites and citizens think of Russia's accession as a completely unlikely scenario.

WESTERN BALKANS

The EU enlargement is nowadays closely identified with the integration of the Western Balkans, as the probability of admitting other countries to the EU than those located in this region is highly limited. The processes of their integration with the EU and NATO¹⁵ are of fundamental value not only for the transformation (democratisation and economic modernisation) of the Western Balkans but also for their stabilisation. They play the role of main anchors stabilising the entire region. It is no coincidence that the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) was born in the Western Balkans which remain a very important arena for its implementation (missions), also as part of unprecedented cooperation with NATO, USA and Turkey. Since the 2007 enlargement, the Western Balkans have been

an enclave within the EU. They constitute the shortest land bridge between the centre of the EU and NATO in Europe (Germany, Northern Italy) and its south-eastern part (Greece, Bulgaria) and Turkey. The integration of the Western Balkans is important for the EU for their economic and demographic potential. The process of enlargement to the Western Balkans is crucial due to their potential instability, unique ethnic and religious structure in Europe and involvement of key international actors. As a result, the process of integration of the Western Balkans is a much more serious challenge for the EU than the previous enlargements.

After the countries of the Eastern Partnership, the Western Balkans are potentially the second most un-

¹⁵ Albania joined NATO in 2009 and Montenegro in 2016. North Macedonia is expected to join the alliance in 2019 or 2020. The accepting of the three remaining countries (Bosnia, Kosovo, Serbia) is very unlikely in the medium-term perspective due to the lack of support from their respective elites (Serbia and Republika Srpska in Bosnia) and the fact that Kosovo is not recognised as an independent state by all NATO members.

DEMOGRAPHY, ECONOMY AND ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS STRUCTURE

The total population of the six Western Balkan countries is only just above 18 million people. However, in recent decades over five million people have emigrated or escaped from the wars in the region and they live now somewhere else, primarily in the EU. Many of them often come to visit. Nearly all Western Balkan countries are among the smallest European economies. They are the poorest countries in Europe apart from the Eastern Partnership countries. The richest country in the Western Balkans, Montenegro, is significantly poorer than Bulgaria, the poorest EU member state.¹⁶ The total GDP of the Western Balkan countries measured by purchasing power parity (GDP PPP) is below USD 275 billion, with the average income per capita amounting to over USD 15,000 (source: IMF). The Western Balkan countries differ significantly in terms of the number of inhabitants and the size of their economy. Serbia definitely stands out in this respect, with the population and economy over 10 times the size of Montenegro, the smallest country in the region. On the other hand, the differences in the income per capita are not so substantial.¹⁷

The Western Balkans are inhabited mainly by three nations: Serbs (40% of the total population in the region), Albanians (30%) and Bosniaks (over 10%). The latter two are particularly highly represented among the region's population that lives outside the Western Balkans. In the upcoming decades their numbers are expected to grow due to higher birth rates in this population. Some Western Balkan countries are among the most ethnically mixed countries in Europe, with their respective largest ethnic groups accounting for: 45% of the population in Montenegro, slightly more than 50% in Bosnia and approx. 60% in North Macedonia. Serbia, Albania and Kosovo are definitely more homogeneous ethnically (the largest ethnic group of approx. 85-95%). On the other hand, over 45% of Albanians live outside Albania. In fact, one can speak of 2.5 Albanian countries in the Balkans, with Albanians accounting for approx. 30% of the population in North Macedonia, constitutionally a state of two nations. A significant part of Serbs and Bosniaks live in the Western Balkans outside their home countries (over 10% of Bosniaks, nearly 20% of Serbs). Serbs account for 30% of the population in Bosnia, with their own Republika Srpska, and Montenegro, while Bosniaks for almost 10% of the population of Montenegro. The religious structure (a broad cultural definition based on religious origins) of the Western Balkans is also unique for Europe. Over a half of the population in the region is Orthodox, approx. 40% are Muslim (most Albanians, Bosniaks, often referred to as Bosnian Muslims, and others), while over 5% are followers of Western Christianity (primarily, Roman Catholics). With the Western Balkan diaspora living in the EU, the proportion of Muslims in the population is slightly higher. Some nations of the Western Balkans have a complex religious structure with numerous religious minorities. This is for example the case with Albanians, Montenegrins and Roma people. Three countries of the Western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia, Kosovo) are mostly inhabited by Muslims who also constitute large minorities in further two Balkan states (nearly 40% in Macedonia and nearly 20% in Montenegro). Within the next decades, Muslims will most likely become the largest religious community in the region (relative majority).

¹⁶ Montenegro's GDP measured by purchasing power parity per capita corresponds to slightly over 80% of the Gross National Income per capita in Bulgaria.

¹⁷ The richest country in the Western Balkans is Montenegro (USD 19,000) while Kosovo is the poorest (USD 11,000).

stable region in Europe. Yet, in terms of safety the situation in the Western Balkans is far better than in the Middle East and North Africa. According to the 2019 Fragile States Index, prepared annually based on comprehensive criteria by The Fund for Peace and the magazine Foreign Policy, every Western Balkan country is less stable than the least stable EU member states. Cyprus is an exception here: it is recognised as less stable than Montenegro which is the most stable country in the Western Balkans. On the other hand, most of the Western Balkan countries rank much higher in the Index than Russia, Turkey and many EaP countries. Bosnia has been found to be the most unstable country in the Western Balkans, ranking slightly lower than Ukraine. The Index does not include Kosovo which would probably score slightly higher than Bosnia. The major challenge for the region revolves around the relationships among its three largest nations: Serbs, Albanians and Bosniaks. A number of issues needs to be faced here: legacy of the wars from the 1990s (no comprehensive reconciliation, historical background); the independence of Kosovo still unrecognised by Serbia; and Bosnia's system of a state composed of two highly autonomous entities, Republika Srpska (Bosnian Serb Republic) inhabited mainly by Serbs and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) inhabited primarily by the Bosniak majority and a smaller Croatian community. The constitution of BiH ensures the full equality of the country's three constituent peoples: Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs. Potential instability of the Western Balkans is also related to soft security issues and the region's strong organised crime, albeit weaker than several years ago. Criminal organisations from the Western Balkans operate also within the EU and are linked to the main mafia structures in the EU. Moreover, the region is also the place of major intercontinental routes for drug trafficking or smuggling refugees and illegal immigrants. They may be joined by Western Balkan people, as clearly demonstrated by the refugee crisis in 2015-2016.

After the Eastern Partnership, the Western Balkans are the least free region in Europe. Freedom House gives all Western Balkan countries the status of Partly Free. For comparison, in the 1990s only two countries in Central Europe (Slovakia and Romania) were for a few years recognised as Partly Free. In contrast, only two Western Balkan countries have ever been declared Free (Montenegro and Serbia) only to decline to Partly Free in the recent years (Montenegro in 2015, Serbia in 2018). According to Freedom House, Albania is currently the most free country in the Western Balkans, followed by Serbia and Montenegro with similar scores. These three countries are close to earning a status upgrade to the Free category. North Macedonia and Kosovo come next, while Bosnia is the least free country (particularly, Republika Srpska).¹⁸ At the same time, Freedom House assesses that mass media in all Western Balkan countries are Partly Free but closer to the status of Not Free rather than Free.

Freedom House points to a significant deterioration in democratic standards in Bosnia, Serbia and Montenegro in the recent years and their definite improvement in Macedonia which was heading toward the category of Not Free. A substantial progress has also been made in Kosovo. On the other hand, a trend of democratic backsliding has been observed in Montenegro and Serbia, i.e. the countries most advanced in their accession negotiations with the EU (see below).

A major problem is a very high level of corruption in the Western Balkans, one of the highest in Europe. Slightly higher levels are reported only in most Eastern Partnership countries and Russia. Compared to EU member states, the level of perception of corruption in Montenegro according to the Corruption Perceptions Index by Transparency International is the same as in Greece and slightly lower than in Bulgaria. The remaining Western Balkan countries are perceived as slightly more corrupt than Bulgaria.¹⁹ Organised crime is also strong in the region and it is related to the mafia

18 Freedom House assigns: the ratings of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the greatest degree of freedom and 7 the smallest degree of freedom, which later translate into the respective status: Free (1-2.5), Partly Free (3-5) or Not Free (5.5-7); and scores (the higher the score, the greater the degree of freedom). The Western Balkan countries have been assessed as follows: Albania 3 (68), Serbia 3 (67), Montenegro 3 (65), Macedonia 3.5 (59), Kosovo 3.5 (54), Bosnia 4 (53).

structures operating within the EU. Their development was enabled by the wars and severe crisis of state institutions after the fall of communism. Further factors contributed to it, such as strong social bonds, a mixed ethnic structure that did not correspond to the state borders, links with the world of politics, security services, formal and informal armed forces, migration diasporas and location on important smuggling routes between Europe and Asia in the EU's neighbourhood. Their role nowadays is smaller, which makes the organised crime in the Western Balkans weaker than several years ago.

Despite the dominant position of NATO and the EU in the region, the Western Balkans are a clash area of the influences between the West and Russia, China, Turkey (at times) and the countries of the Persian Gulf. A particular challenge is the negative role of Russia. Outside the territory of the former USSR, the soft power of the Kremlin is nowhere else as strong as it is in the Balkans. Moscow destabilises the region (e.g. by getting involved in the failed coup d'état in Montenegro or attempting to derail the Greek-Macedonian agreement regarding Macedonia's name), because it strongly opposes the expansion of NATO and the final resolution of the region's problems. The case of Serbia

and Republika Srpska is unique in Central Europe, as until now all countries of the region were interested in joining NATO and the EU at the same time. Russia's strength in the Western Balkans is based on Serbs sympathising with it and a high level of support in both Serbian society and a large part of Serbian elites for an alliance with Russia and for Russian foreign policy (particularly in Republika Srpska). Serbia is a European country outside the former USSR with the most developed military cooperation with Russia (joint military exercises carried out more often with Russia than with NATO under the Partnership for Peace, repairs and purchases of Russian equipment, a Russian humanitarian centre located in the territory of Serbia, a potential military base, intelligence cooperation). Russia is also an important economic partner of Republika Srpska, Montenegro and Serbia. In every Western Balkan country, most residents are in favour of EU membership. However, in some surveys a significant part of the Serbian society is against it, with less than a half supporting the idea. Furthermore, the vast majority of the inhabitants of Republika Srpska oppose the accession because it would be equal to limiting their right of veto on internal affairs, as requested by Brussels. To compare, the vast majority of Albanians and Bosniaks support the integration with the EU.

19 In general, the scores of the Balkan countries in the Corruption Perceptions Index do not differ much (the Index uses a scale of 0 to 100, where 0 is highly corrupt and 100 is very clean): Greece 45, Montenegro 45, Bulgaria 42, Serbia 39, Bosnia 38, Kosovo 37 and Albania 36.

THE EU ENLARGEMENT TO WESTERN BALKANS

The Western Balkans are already very strongly integrated with the EU in the social and economic dimension (trade, investments, migrants, refugees, financial transfers, tourism, development assistance, students).²⁰ The enlargement process in the Western Balkans is much slower compared to the integration of Central Europe. On the one hand, the region struggles with much more severe problems but on the other the EU itself is partly responsible for this slowdown. While Germany plays a key role in the region, it does not have such a strong influence in it. Neither is it as interested in the Western Balkans as it was in Central Europe prior to the enlargement in 2004. Considerable engagement of Italy (limited democratisation agenda in foreign policy) as well as many small and medium-size EU member states (Austria, Slovenia, Croatia, Greece, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania), often pursuing their own interests, makes the structure of EU involvement in the region much more complex compared to the previous enlargements. Naturally, many of the neighbours of the Western Balkan countries have significant political or economic problems themselves, and their potential to act as a source of inspiration is therefore usually limited.

A popular option in the case of the Western Balkans is that of ‘small stabilisation’ – as long a pre-accession period and accession negotiations as possible to allow the Balkan countries ‘really’ prepare for membership – which is perceived as an optimal solution. This attitude is related to the belief that the accession of Bulgaria and Romania was too hasty. The negative phenomena in the EU observed in the countries which joined the

EU in 2004 (Poland and Hungary) may only contribute to this way of thinking. More importantly, the said authoritarian trends, mixed with nationalism and the weakening of the rule of law within the EU, undermine the Union’s credibility in promoting democratisation, ethnic reconciliation and in fighting corruption.

Due to severe problems currently faced by the EU, such as Brexit, migration and refugee crisis, eurozone crisis, Russian aggression on Ukraine or wars in the Middle East, the Western Balkans have recently rarely been treated as a priority region. The pace of accession process of the Western Balkan countries is also affected by their problems in relations with individual EU member states, such as the dispute between Skopje and Athens over Macedonia’s name or non-recognition of Kosovo’s independence by five EU member states.

The accession process of the Western Balkans began at the summit in Santa Maria da Feira in Portugal in 2000 when the EU recognised all countries of the region as potential candidates, i.e. countries with the prospect of membership. At that time, Serbia was an authoritarian regime country under the rule of President Slobodan Milošević. Unlike in the case of Central Europe, with respect to the Western Balkan countries the EU adopted a decidedly individual approach, addressing each country separately. In that period, Croatia was still treated as a state belonging to this region. In 2003, Zagreb was the first to apply for membership only to be followed by North Macedonia (2004), Montenegro (2008), Albania and Serbia (2009), and Bosnia (only in 2016). The status

20 The EU’s share in the external trade of the Western Balkan countries exceeds 70%. Its share in the balance of direct foreign investments is similar.

Tourism and travelling accounts for 25% of the GDP in Albania and over 20% in Montenegro. The share of this sector in the labour force is, respectively, 25% in Albania and over 15% in Montenegro. It accounts for 10% of the GDP in Bosnia and approx. 7% in Serbia and North Macedonia, respectively. The vast majority of tourists from outside the Western Balkans who visit this region come from the EU.

According to the OECD, official development assistance (ODA) in 2017 accounted for 5.4% of the GNP in Kosovo, 4.4% in Serbia, 2.4% in Montenegro and Bosnia, 1.4% in Macedonia and 1.2% in Albania.

Money transfers from economic emigrants account for 15% of the GDP in Kosovo, 9-11% in Albania, Bosnia, Montenegro and Serbia, and 3% in Macedonia, with the vast majority of funds coming from citizens of the Western Balkan countries working in the EU.

According to UNESCO, over 5% of Serbian, over 7% of Macedonian, 12% of Albanian and Bosnian and 20% of Montenegrin students studied abroad in the academic year 2017/2018. No data is available for students from Kosovo but it may be assumed that their numbers were similar to those of students from Albania and Bosnia.

of candidate country was then granted to North Macedonia in 2005, Montenegro in 2010, Serbia in 2012 and Albania in 2014, respectively. Based on the experience with the accession of Croatia, the European Commission (EC) improved its enlargement strategy in 2011, placing a particular emphasis on the rule of law. The EC decided that the negotiating chapters on judiciary and fundamental rights (chapter 23) and on justice, freedom and security (chapter 24) should be opened already at the early stage of all future negotiations. So far, only Montenegro and Serbia have started accession negotiations (in 2012 and 2014, respectively). By May 2019, Serbia opened 16 negotiating chapters and closed two, while Montenegro managed to open 32 chapters and close three.

Although it was the first to receive the status of candidate country in the Western Balkans, North Macedonia has still not started the negotiations, mostly due to the dispute with Greece over its name. Since 2009, the EC has recommended starting negotiations with this country several times. Despite its commitment from 1995 not to block Macedonia's membership in international organisations due to their dispute over the name, Greece strongly opposed the commencement of negotiations with Skopje. The blocking of the integration process resulted in a considerable rise in the authoritarian trends of the ruling elite. The country's authoritarian drift was stopped only by mass demonstrations and elections that led to the shift of power. The situation changed dramatically in autumn 2018 when Greece and now North Macedonia concluded the agreement regarding the latter's name. As a result, North Macedonia – together with Albania – will probably start its accession negotiations in June 2019. The progress of reforms in Albania led the EC to recommend (already in its 2016 and 2018 reports) commencing negotiations with this country. Despite these recommendations, Albania will most probably begin accession negotiations only now (in June 2019). Their commencement was not possible before due to the opposition of some of EU member states, e.g. Germany.

Bosnia whose internal situation is the most complicated of all Western Balkan countries applied for membership only in 2016. Its late application was also

caused by the difference in positions among EU member states regarding the international protectorate in Bosnia. The submission of the application was possible with the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) entering into force at the end of 2015. The EU led to the introduction of the SAA, having adopted a renewed approach to Bosnia, focused primarily on economic issues. With this, however, the resolution of the country's significant internal political problems has been postponed.

Kosovo's integration with the EU is the least advanced. The country declared its independence only in 2008 and has still not been recognised by five EU member states: Cyprus, Greece, Spain, Romania and Slovakia. Consequently, Kosovo has not applied for membership yet. It has been involved in a dialogue process with Serbia of which it was an autonomous province for several decades (then as part of former Yugoslavia) and which does not recognise its independence. The EU believes that the dialogue should lead to the normalisation of relations and implicitly to the recognition of Kosovo's independence by Belgrade. Most likely it is only then that Kosovo will be able to proceed with its integration process.

In February 2018, the EC published a new strategy for the Western Balkans which defines the priorities and areas for cooperation. The strategy confirms the European future of the Western Balkans as a geostrategic investment in a stable, strong and united Europe based on common values. Six flagship initiatives were announced which address specific areas of mutual interest: the rule of law, security and migration, socio-economic development, increasing connectivity (in terms of transport and energy infrastructure), digital agenda, reconciliation and good neighbourly relations. The Strategy states that Montenegro and Serbia could potentially be ready for membership by 2025, while also admitting that this perspective is 'extremely ambitious'. According to the EC, the countries may catch up or overtake each other depending on progress being made. At the same time it is stressed that the rule of law must be given utmost priority as this is a key criterion by which the progress of the Western Balkan countries in their integration process will be assessed.

PROGNOSIS

1. It is highly unlikely for Iceland, Norway and Switzerland to join the EU due to their citizens' strong and constant opposition. Most of the political elites of Iceland and Switzerland do not support the idea of their countries integrating with the EU – unlike Norway where pro-European parties with accession included in their political manifesto enjoy great popularity. The United Kingdom is just about to exit the EU. While in 2016 most British people voted for leaving the EU, nowadays the (mostly relative) majority of them declare the opposite. Consequently, Scotland and, albeit this is much less likely, Wales might choose to opt out from the UK. Another possible scenario is that Northern Ireland decides to join with the Irish Republic. In the future, this might result in the UK – and/or its countries that will seek independence – re-joining the EU.
 2. The relations between the EU and the Eastern Partnership (EaP) will largely depend on Russia's internal affairs. Its democratisation or substantial weakening may allow the EaP countries to initiate their integration with the EU. However, for the time being this scenario is rather unlikely due to Russia's weak civil society, economic crisis and strong position of its authorities. Even with its democratisation the sceptical attitude of EU member states to its accession will not subside. With its gigantic territory, large numbers of citizens and geographical location, the Russian Federation in its nature still resembles too much of a superpower.
 3. Turkey's integration process cannot be reactivated without the country's deep democratisation. This scenario, albeit more real than in the case of Russia, is rather unlikely as the authoritarian rule of the current elites seems to enjoy a relatively high support in the society. The democratisation of Turkey would probably not change the clearly negative attitude of many European citizens and EU member states to its accession. Brexit may be expected to only reinforce their way of thinking, with the EU being increasingly more identified with the eurozone.
- Also, in Turkey itself the support of the society and new political elites for joining such an internally deeply integrated EU may now be much lower than several years ago.
4. The enlargement process in the upcoming decade will be limited to the Western Balkans. The countries of the region will probably join the EU one by one or maximum two at a time. It seems that their accession will be extended over a period not shorter than 10-15 years. The main challenges for the EU enlargement to the Western Balkans will be the internal situation in Bosnia and the issue of Kosovo. In both cases, the policy of Serbia and Republika Srpska in Bosnia will be of crucial importance to the process. Another serious challenge will be close relations of Belgrade and (particularly) Banja Luka with Russia which may use its Serbian influences against the EU.
 5. If their relations with the West deteriorate, Russia and Turkey may try to undermine the stability of the Balkans by tapping into the ethnic tensions in the region. While it is rather unlikely for the situation from the 1990s (outbreak of a full-scale conventional or partisan war) to repeat itself, local riots, military incidents with non-political actors and terrorist attacks are much more probable, particularly in the case of economic decline. A debacle in the stabilisation process of the Western Balkans (a small region that is already highly integrated with the EU), closely connected with the accession, would constitute a serious blow to the EU and its international credibility on the global arena.
 6. The effective building of the state under the rule of law, closely related to free media, will be crucial for the tempo of the EU enlargement. However, if corruption is to be eliminated, the economic situation in the Western Balkans must also improve. The acceleration of economic growth will be very difficult to achieve without a significant increase in the EU funding at the pre-accession stage. This would

allow the Western Balkans to compete more effectively with the countries of Central Europe which have largely benefited from the EU subsidies. In terms of absolute numbers, the required funding is not so high; nevertheless, obtaining support for this solution within the EU will pose a serious challenge.

7. As a result of the EU enlargement to the Western Balkans, for the first time the Union would be joined by countries with an entirely or largely Muslim population that is well- or over-represented in the ruling elites of these mixed-religion countries.²¹ Therefore, a reflection on the role and place of Islam and the heritage of the Ottoman Empire

in the history and culture of Europe will be inevitable. Also, as part of this enlargement process the EU would be joined by three countries that are mostly Orthodox (Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro) along with numerous Orthodox minorities (Bosnia, Albania), which would translate into a considerable increase in the number of Orthodox states in the EU (nowadays there are only four). Consequently, more thought will have to be given to the Byzantine heritage and its part in Europe's identity. An important challenge for the enlargement process may be the growing support within the EU for anti-Muslim parties that may play the 'Islamophobia' card against the membership of some of the countries in the region.

²¹ In the government of North Macedonia, 40% of ministers are Muslim (a number slightly higher than the proportion of Muslims in the general population), and so is the head of the parliament. In Montenegro's government, Muslims account for 35% of ministers, which is nearly twice as many as the proportion of Muslims in the general population. To compare, in Bulgaria 15% of the population are Muslim but there are no Muslims in the Bulgarian government.

SOURCES

European Commission, A credible enlargement perspective for and enhanced EU engagement with the Western Balkans, 6 February 2018:

https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/communication-credible-enlargement-perspective-western-balkans_en.pdf

European Commission, Strategy and Reports:

https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/countries/package_en

European Parliament, “40 Years of EU Enlargements”:

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/external/html/euenlargement/default_en.htm

Freedom House, Freedom in the World:

<https://freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world>

Fund for Peace, Fragile States Index 2019:

<https://fundforpeace.org/2019/04/10/fragile-states-index-2019/>

Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2018:

https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/corruption_perceptions_index_2018



www.schuman.pl